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NOTES AND COADIENTS
The United States Supreme Court has also taken a position in
agreement with the Kentucky court, holding that such provisions are
consistent with the Bankruptcy Act. In Stellwagen v. Clum20 the Su-
preme Court had before it a provision similar to the Ohio general as-
signment laws which provided in effect that any transfer by a debtor
to prefer creditors, or with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud them
shall, if the transferee knew of such intent, be declared void at the
suit of any creditor and a receiver appointed to administer the debtor's
assets pro rata for the benefit of all creditors. The court held that
such provisions were consistent with the Bankruptcy Act in that their
purpose was the avoidance of fraudulent and preferential transfers,
thus promoting equality of distribution. The court further observed:
"Our decisions lay great stress upon this feature of the law (dis-
charge of the debtor) . . . which is wholly wanting in the Ohio
statutes under consideration."
Furthermore, the U. S. Supreme Court held that the general pro-
visions of assignment statutes resembling those of Kentucky are to be
held valid as against the contention that they were in conflict with the
national act.21
In conclusion, the Kentucky general assignment law merely regu-
lates the trust created by the deed of assignment, providing for pro
rata distribution of the debtor's assets, while not providing for his dis-
charge and, therefore, is not in conflict with the National Act.
Wmi. S. Thai r_
ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT
There are two basic types of arrest-those made under a warrant
and those made without a warrant. Since those made with a warrant
are generally lawful insofar as the act of arrest itself is concerned and
the usual fault to be found with them is in the warrant rather than
the arrest, the more complex situation of arrest without a warrant will
be dealt with.
The law of arrest without a warrant may be neatly divided into
two categories depending upon whether the crime for which the arrest
may still proceed against the debtor on his claim, but only waives his right to
share in the assets of the assigned estate. This is not the type of discharge con-
templated by the Bankruptcy Act.
'See 245 U. S. 605 (1917).
'See Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379 (1883), where the Supreme Court con-
strued the New Jersey statutes which are almost identical with those of Kentucky.
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is made is a felony or a misdemeanor, and further may be subdivided
by determining whether the person making the arrest is a peace
officer or a private person.
A. Arrest for a Felony by a Peace Officer
A peace officer may arrest for a felony committed in his presence.
This is probably the most non-controversial statement that can be
made in regard to any phase of the law of arrest without a warrant.
There seems to be no authority to the contrary. Even so simple and
well-established a statement as this must be interpreted. Courts have
been called upon many times to construe the phrase "in his presence."
Generally, an offense is considered to have been committed in the
presence of the person making the arrest if he can see the offense being
committed,' if he can hear the offense being committed or the effects
of its commission,2 or even if he can smell the offense being commit-
ted.8 From these decisions anytime a person's attention is directed
to the crime at the time of its commission through one of his own
senses, it may be said to have been committed in his presence.
An officer may also arrest without a warrant when the person
arrested has committed a felony although it was not committed in the
presence of the officer.4 This proposition is generally accepted and
usually the grounds of the officer's belief that the felony was commit-
ted is not questioned so long as the person arrested did actually com-
mit it.
Further, it is well settled at common law and is the generally ac-
cepted rule in this country today that an officer may arrest when a
felony has in fact been committed although not by the person arrested
if the officer had reasonable ground for believing that it was committed
by the person arrested.5 Once again a very difficult problem of con-
struction arises. What constitutes "reasonable grounds" for believing
that the person arrested did commit a felony? The question of reason-
ableness is held to be a question of law for the court.6 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals has stated the proposition thus: ".... This court has
without exception held that, where the facts are in dispute, the issue
'State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 330, 101 S.E. 434 (1919).
'Carrolton v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 58 So. 486 (1912); Brooks v. State, 114 Ga. 6,
39 S.E. 877 (1901); Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550, 11 S.W. 651 (1889).
' McBride v. U. S., 284 Fed. 416 (C.C.A. 5th 1922).
'A number of states have statutes which contain this provision, see REsTATE-
smENr, CramwnAL PnocEnuRa, commentary to sec. 21, subsec. (B), p. 234 (1931).
'Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 Tx. L. REv. 293 (1946).
'People v. Kelvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 P. 799 (1894); Filer v. Smith, 96
Mich. 347, 55 N.W. 999 (1893); State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 (1888); Diers v.
Mallon, 46 Neb. 121, 64 N.W. 722 (1895).
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should be submitted to the jury under the appropriate instruction;
but, where the facts alleged are undisputed, it becomes a question of-
law for the court."7 In other words the actual happenings are de-
termined by the jury but where these events constitute reasonable
ground for the belief that the person committed the felony is to be
decided by the court. The writer is somewhat puzzled by this ap-
proach to the problem. Certainly the test applied is one of reasonable-
ness-would a reasonable man or a reasonable officer have thought
from the circumstances that the felony was committed by the person
arrested? It would appear that twelve reasonable men, as jurors are
assumed to be, would be in a better position to determine what is
reasonable than a judge who has heard many such cases and is per-
haps too familiar with the usual circumstances which lead to arrest
to be able to accept each particular case upon its facts and to isolate
it from similar cases which have come within his experience. Thus he
would find it difficult to put himself in the place of either the police
officer or the private person faced with the problem. "Probable cause"
is belief fairly arising out of facts known to the officer that the party
is engaged in the commission of the crime.8 Mere suspicion or in-
formation is not enough.9 The knowledge which gives rise to prob-
able cause must be known at the time of the arrest and must not be
knowledge gained after the arrest or from events subsequent thereto. 10
Generally an officer may make an arrest when he has reasonable
grounds to believe that a felony has been or is being committed and
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has com-
mitted or is committing it,". although neither factor exists. For con-
venience this proposition gives rise to a situation which may be re-
ferred to as "double mistake" in that the officer making the arrest is
mistaken both as to the commission of the felony and as to the guilt of
the person arrested. Various types of statutes have been enacted in
this country dealing with this phase of the problem. Many of them
are merely a codification of the common law.'2 A few state that an
" Grau v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521, 209 S.W. 260, 271 (1919).
'Frosta v. U. S., 51 F. 2d 330 (C.C.A. 8th 1931).
Poldo v. U. S., 55 F. 2d 866 (C.C.A. 9th 1932).
U. S. v. Gowen 40 F. 2d 593 (C.C.A. 2d 1930).
People v. Bressler, 223 Mich. 597, 194 N.W. 559 (1923); Diers v. Mallon,
46 Neb. 121, 64 N.W. 722 (1894); State v. Huglett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841
(1923); Allen v. Lopinsky, 81 W. Va. 13, 94 S.E. 269 (1917).
For example, see 10 OMo GEN. CODE ANN. sec. 13432-2 (Page, 1938)
which provides: "When a felony has been committed, or there is reasonable
grounds to believe that a felony has been committed, any person without a warrant
may arrest another whom he has reasonable cause to believe is guvilty of the offense,
and detain him until a warrant can be obtained." Note that this statute extends
the "double mistake" proposition to private persons making the arrest, most statutes
do not.
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officer may arrest on a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the
commission of a felony by the person arrested 3 while others allow
"double mistake" only at night time.14 Only one or two states have
more rigid requirements and do not allow "double mistake".'
Officers also have the authority to take steps to prevent the com-
mission of a felony by arresting a person when there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the latter is about to commit a felony.16
B. Arrest of a Felon by a Private Person
A private person may arrest without a warrant for a felony com-
mitted in his presence. Beyond this one fundamental rule, the law of
arrest by a private person without a warrant is neither uniform nor
clear. It is the almost universal rule, either by decision or by statute,
that a private person may arrest without a warrant when a felony is
actually committed by the person arrested upon reasonable belief
even though it was not committed in his presence. A few states stop
at this point.1' More generally, however, an arrest is valid if a felony
was actually committed even though not by the person arrested, if
there is a reasonable belief that he committed it.'8 A few states allow
the "double mistake"-no felony at all and no wrong by the person
arrested-even on the part of a private person.19
A private person also has the right of making an arrest without a
warrant for the purpose of preventing the commission of a felony.20
C. Arrest for Misdemeanor by Officer
The right to arrest a person who has committed or is suspected of
having committed a misdemeanor is much more limited than the right
to arrest felons or suspected felons. By weighing interests, it is readily
seen that the risk of arresting an innocent person for a felony is of
little importance in comparison with the necessity of bringing the
See 2 TEN. CoDE ANN. sec. 11536 (4) (Williams, 1934).
U 6 UTA CoDE ANN. T. 105, ch. 13, sec. 3 (1934); "A peace officer ... may,
without a warrant, arrest a person . . . (5) at night, when there is reasonable
cause to believe that he has committed a felony."
"See N. Y. CGmm. CODEs, sec. 177 (3) (Thompson, 1939) which provides
for arrest when a felony has actually been committed though not by the person
arrested and section 179 which makes the same provision for night time arrests.
" See State v. Huglett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841 (1923).
' Lindquist v. Friedmans (Il. App.) 1 N.E. 2d 529 (1939); People v. Cov-
ernale, 193 N. Y. 581, 86 N.E. 554 (1908).
'"Martin v. State, 97 Ark. 212, 133 S.W. 598 (1911); Imler v. Yeager, 245
S.W. 200 (Mo. 1922).
"9 Brady v. U. S., 300 F. 540 (C.C.A. 6th 1924); State v. Griffin, 74 S. C. 412,
54 S.E. 603 (1906).
"°Cobb v. Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 133 S.E. 42 (1926).
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felon to custody while he is available, while an unlawful arrest of a
person upon suspicion of having committed a misdemeanor may lead
to a wrong as bad or worse than the misdemeanor itself. For that
reason the occasions upon which either an officer or a private person
may arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant are limited.
Most states hold, either by statute or decision, that an officer may
arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his presence.21 However, at
common law and in a few states today only a misdemeanor amounting
to a breach of the peace or one for which special statutory provision is
made justifies an arrest without a warrant.22 Statutes which provide
that an officer may arrest for an "offense" committed in his presence
have generally interpreted the term "offense" to include a mis-
demeanor.23 An arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant must be
made at the time of the act or on fresh pursuit.24
D. Arrest for a Misdemeanor by a Private Person
The general rule is that a private person may arrest for a mis-
demeanor committed in his presence if the misdemeanor amounts to a
breach of the peace. This was the common law rule. However, there
is an increasing tendency toward permitting a private person to arrest
for any misdemeanor committed in his presence. The conspicious ex-
ception to both the rule and the exception is found in Kentucky,25 and
possibly West Virginia,26 where a private person may not arrest for
any misdemeanor. No state has as yet allowed an arrest by a private
person without a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in his
presence.
Recommendations
It is apparent that the law of arrest without a warrant varies in
the several jurisdictions to a considerable degree. The reason for this
variance in the laws of the various states is not apparent. It is the
writer's opinion that in almost every instance the majority rule is the
R obertson v. State, 53 Ark. 516, 14 S.W. 902 (1890); Franklin v. Amerson,
118 Ga. 860, 45 S.E. 698 (1903); People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 91 P. 997 (1907);
State v. Mills, 6 Del. 497, 69 AtI. 841 (1908); Caffini v. Hermann, 112 Me. 282, 91
AtI. 1009 (1914).
'Lee v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 94, 74 S.W. 28 (1903); Stittgen v. Rundle, 99
Wis. 78, 74 N.W. 536 (1898).
'Sims v. Smith, 115 Conn. 297, 161 AUt. 239 (1932); People v. Ford, 356
Il1. 572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934).
"People v. Johnson, 86 Mich. 175, 48 N.W. 870 (1891); State v. Lewis, 50
Ohio St. 179, 33 N.E. 405 (1893). Cf. Stevens v. Gilbert, 120 N. Y. S. 114
(1909).
" Reich v. Bailey, 123 Ky. 827, 832, 97 S.W. 747, 748 (1906).
'Allen v. Lopinsky, 81 W. Va. 18, 94 S.E. 369 (1917).
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best rule. There are, however, two situations in which a minority rule
is sounder. A private person should, contrary to the majority rule, be
able to make an arrest for a felony upon reasonable belief that one
has been committed. Further a private person should not be allowed
to arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his presence not amounting
to a breach of the peace. It is contended that public interest is great
enough in the first situation to warrant arrest by a private person,
while in the second situation these lesser offenses are not a serious
enough threat to the public to afford the right of arrest by a private
person.
The result reached by accepting the majority view with these two
exceptions could be codified briefly as follows:
A police officer may arrest without a warrant:
(1) for a felony committed in his presence;
(2) upon reasonable belief that a felony has been committed and
reasonable belief that the person arrested committed it;
(3) to prevent the commission of a felony;
(4) for a misdemeanor committed in his presence.
A private person may arrest without a warrant:
(1) for a felony committed in his presence;
(2) upon reasonable belief that a felony has been committed and
reasonable belief that the person arrested committed it;
(8) to prevent the commission of a felony;
(4) for any misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace com-
mitted in his presence.
NoimA D. Bosrpn
CRIMINAL LAW-THE USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE
OF PROPERTY
In most civilized countries, the right to acquire and own property
is recognized by law. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to assume
that in connection with the right to own, a property owner should
have a right to defend his property against an aggressor. Nevertheless,
it is axiomatic that the law places a higher value on life than on prop-
erty. Consequently there exists a basic principle that one is not
privileged to kill in order to protect property.' However, certain ex-
'Russell v. State, 219 Ala. 567, 122 So. 683 (1929); 1 BISHOP, Cmn~fnAL
LAw 610 (9th ed. 1928); MAY, CRnINAL LAW 76 (4th ed. 1988); 26 Am. Jut.
272 (1940); 40 C. J. S. 977 (1944).
